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Scott discovered his domain-theoretic models of the λ-calculus, isomorphic to their func-
tion space, in 1969. A natural completeness problem then arises: whether any two terms
equal in all Scott models are convertible. There is also an analogous consistency prob-
lem: whether every equation between two terms, consistent with the λ-calculus, has a
Scott model. We consider such questions for wider sets of sentences and wider classes
of models, the pointed (completely) partially ordered ones. A negative result for a set
of sentences shows the impossibility of ﬁnding Scott models for that class; a positive
result gives evidence that there might be enough Scott models. We ﬁnd, for example, that
the order-extensional pointed ω-cpo models are complete for 1-sentences with positive
matrices, whereas the consistency question for 1-sentences with equational matrices
depends on the consistency of certain critical sentences asserting the existence of certain
functions analogous to the generalized Mal’cev operators ﬁrst considered in the context of
the λ-calculus by Selinger.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Scott discovered his remarkable domain-theoretic models of the untyped λ-calculus, more precisely the λβη-calculus,
in 1969: see the remarks in [10] and see [12] for further references. Having a class of mathematically interesting models
available, a natural completeness problem arises: if two terms are equal in the class, here that of all Scott’s models, are
they then equal in all models, equivalently, are they βη-convertible? As stated so far, the problem is not quite precise: one
should refer to a speciﬁc class of models such as all pointed ω-cpos isomorphic to their own function space. This equational
completeness problem seems to have appeared ﬁrst in the literature in [5]; a positive solution was given in [2], but with
models taken in the category with objects the pointed partial orders with lubs of both increasing ω0- and ω1-chains, and
with morphisms the monotonic functions preserving just the lubs of the increasing ω1-chains.
A related problem exists for the λβ-calculus and, e.g., pointed ω-cpos having their own function space as a retract. There
is also a natural consistency problem: if an equation is consistent, meaning one cannot use it to derive the equation x = y,
does it have a model, e.g., a non-trivial pointed ω-cpo isomorphic to its own function space?
In this paper, we consider problems of these kinds for the λ-calculus, various classes of models and various sets of
sentences (i.e., closed formulae), not only equations. Here is our general framework. LetT be a ﬁrst-order theory, e.g., that
for combinatory logic, for the λβ-calculus or for the λβη-calculus; let C be a class of models ofT; and letF be a set of
sentences. We say thatC isF-complete if the following holds:
∀ϕ ∈F.(∀M ∈ C.M |= ϕ) ⇒ (∀M |=T.M |= ϕ)
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and we say thatC isF-consistent if the following holds:
∀ϕ ∈F.(∃M |=T.M |= ϕ) ⇒ (∃M ∈ C.M |= ϕ)
As Scott’s methods yield models of the λβη-calculus and the λβ-calculus, we are mainly interested in those calculi, but
we also discuss combinatory logic. As regards sentences, expanding our interest from equations to ﬁrst-order sentences is
mathematically natural and enables us to take some ‘distance’ from thehard, unsolved, equational problems but nevertheless
try to cast some light on them. As a strategy it has pluses and minuses, making counterexamples easier to ﬁnd but positive
results harder to prove. In this regardwe take a standard approach, considering various prenex sets of sentences, and seeking
counterexamples of minimal logical complexity and positive results for sentences of maximal logical complexity.
As regards models, we are mainly interested in very general classes, such as those admitting pointed partial orders, or
pointed ω-cpos, with corresponding results generally going through for pointed dcpos. Despite their generality, results for
these classes do have some bearing on Scott models. On the one hand, negative results apply also to Scott models, asF-
completeness orF-consistency for a class of models implies the same for any subclass. On the other hand, positive results
can be taken as providing some evidence that Scott models are also complete or consistent in the relevant sense.
Following [6,1], one may also look for categorical rather than partially ordered models; it would be interesting to try to
extend the results of this paper to suchmodels, cf. [8, Section 3]. Relatedwork appears in [9,4]. Much of the emphasis there is
on a somewhat different question, also generalising the equational completeness question: whether a λ-theory is the theory
of a model in a given class of models.
After some technical preliminaries in Section 2, we consider questions of completeness in Section 3, in particular giving
Theorem 4, establishing completeness for 1-sentences with positive matrix. Section 4 considers questions of consistency,
in particular presenting a reduction of 2-consistency to the consistency with the λ-calculus of certain nonlinear equations
analogous to those holding for generalizedMal’cev operators [11]. The paper concludeswith some ﬁnal remarks in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
We refer the reader to Barendregt’s book [3] for background information on the λ-calculus and combinatory logic. We
generally follow his notation, noting any signiﬁcant differences where they occur. We consider three ﬁrst-order theories
with equality,TCL,Tβ andTβη , over the signature with two constants K and S and a binary ‘application’ operation ·; the
applicationoperation iswritten as an inﬁx, or evenomitted entirely, and,whetherwritten explicitly or implicitly, applications
are associated to the left. The equational theory of combinatory logic is given by the following two equations:
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
We takeTCL to be given by these two equations together with the sentence K /= S, in order to exclude trivial models.
Second,Tβ is the extension ofTCL by the following three axioms:
(∀z. xz = yz) ⇒ 1x = 1y
12K = K
13S = S
where 11 =def 1 =def S(KI) and 1n+1 =def S(K1)(S(K1n)), and where I is the identity combinator SKK. Third, Tβη is the
extension ofTCL by the following axiom of extensionality:
(∀z. xz = yz) ⇒ x = y
Models are, as usual, interpretationsM = (X , K, S, ·) satisfying the axioms. The theoryTCL axiomatises the non-trivial
combinatory algebras [3, 5.1.8]; the theoryTβ axiomatises the non-trivial λ-models [3, 5.6.3]; and the theoryTβη axioma-
tises the non-trivial extensional λ-models.
We now consider the relation between our theories and combinatory logic and the λ-calculus. It is convenient to allow
extra constants. For the theories, one extends the signature with a given set of extra constants, but no further axioms; for
the calculi one extends the terms (and, consequently, substitution and conversion) by a given set of constants, in the evident
way.
In one direction, we translate terms t ofTCL (respectively,Tβ ,Tβη) to terms Mt of combinatory logic (respectively,
the λβ-calculus, the λβη-calculus). In the case of combinatory logic, Mt is just t. In the other two cases, application is read
as application, K and S as λx.λy.x and λf .λg.λx.fx(gx), and the constants as themselves, and so Mt is Barendregt’s Mλ, see [3,
7.3.1], extended to handle the constants. We rely on context to tell which of the translations is meant.
In the other direction we translate terms M of combinatory logic (respectively, the λβ-calculus, the λβη-calculus) to
terms tM ofTCL (respectively,Tβ ,Tβη). In the case of combinatory logic tM is simply M and in the other two cases tM is
Barendregt’s tCL, see [3, 7.3.1], extended to handle the constants. We again rely on context to tell which of the translations
is meant. We write the Curry abstraction operator applied to a ﬁrst-order term t and variable x as λ*x.t [3, 5.1].
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One has that t = tMt is provable in the relevant ﬁrst-order theory and that M and MtM are convertible in the relevant
calculus. One further has thatM andN are convertible in a given calculus if andonly if tM = tN is provable in the corresponding
theory and that t = u is provable in a theory if and only if Mt and Mu are convertible in the relevant calculus. This is trivial
for combinatory logic; for the λβ- and the λβη-calculi, one uses the results in [3, 7.3], extended to handle the constants.
We consider three kinds of equational theory Th. Combinatory logic theories are equational theories extending the above
two equations for K and S; one also allows constants in the terms and equations, taken from a given set of constants. For
the λβ-calculus one considers λ-theories in the sense of [3] and for the λβη-calculus one considers his λη-theories, allowing
additional constants in both cases. We write M =Th N to assert that the equation M = N is in the theory Th (and so =Th is
the relation {(M,N)|M =Th N}) and wewrite CL, λβ and λβη for, respectively, the minimal combinatory logic theory, λ-theory
and λη-theory with no constants.
Given an equationally consistent theory Th, i.e., one that does not contain the equation x = y, one can construct the open
term modelMTh of the relevant theoryT. The domain of the model is the collection of equivalence classes [M] of open
terms, where the equivalence relation is=Th, that of the relevant equational theory. Application is deﬁned by [M][N] = [MN];
K and S are interpreted by [K] and [S] or by [λx.λy.x] and [λf .λg.λx.fx(gx)] as appropriate. The denotation of a term t, assigning
[M1], . . . , [Mn] to its free variables x1, . . . , xn, is [Mt [M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn]] (we employ a different notation for substitution than
that used in [3]). Note thatMCL,Mλβ andMλβη are the usual open term models.
One can also obtain theories frommodels. LetM be a model of one of our theories which also interprets the given set of
constants. Then {M = N |M |= tM = tN} is a consistent equational theory of the corresponding kind.
Our results concern partially ordered or pomodels. An interpretation is partially ordered (a po interpretation) if its carrier
is a partial order and application is monotone; it is further pointed (a ppo interpretation) if it has a least element, written
⊥. Strictly speaking, po interpretations are not interpretations as they have additional structure: we should rather speak of
interpretations admitting a compatible partial order. However, the looser way of speaking will not create any difﬁculties and
we continue with it.
A po interpretation of one of our three theoriesT is a model if it is in the usual ﬁrst-order sense. If it is a model of CL one
has ⊥ ·x =⊥. It is natural to consider partially ordered versions of one of the axioms for 1 and of extensionality. We say that
a po interpretation ofTβ is 1-order-extensional if we have:
∀z. (xz ≤ yz) ⇒ 1x ≤ 1y
and that a po interpretation ofTβη is order-extensional if we have:
∀z. (xz ≤ yz) ⇒ x ≤ y
A ppo interpretation is a pointed cpo (or cppo) interpretation if its carrier is a pointed cpo and application is continuous in
both arguments. More precisely, we consider two cases: in the ﬁrst by cpowemean ω-cpo where lubs of increasing ω-chains
exist and continuity means preserving those lubs; and in the second we mean dcpo where lubs of all directed sets exist and
continuitymeans preserving those lubs. For themost part, our results do not depend on this distinction and sowe onlymake
it when needed.
In the cases ofTβ orTβη we deﬁne a retractmodel to be a cppo that has as a retract the space of its continuous self-maps
with application, K and S then given in the usualway; in the case ofTβη the retract is then necessarily an isomorphism. Every
cppo model of CL has a least-ﬁxed point operator, i.e., an element Y such that Y · x = ∨ xn· ⊥: one takes Y to be ∨n≥0 Y(n),
where Y(0) =⊥ and Y(n+1) = SKY(n).
We classify sentences according to quantiﬁer and matrix complexity. By n we mean the n-sentences, and similarly
for n. By n(POS) (respectively, n(EQ )) we mean those sentences equivalent to a n-sentence with positive matrix
(respectively, equational matrix), and similarly for n(POS) and n(EQ ). By EQ we (evidently) mean 0(EQ ), and similarly
for POS. As combinatory logic permits pairing, repeated universal or existential quantiﬁers can be reduced to single ones and
conjunctions of equations can be reduced to single equations. Further, whenworkingwithTβ orTβη , ∀x.t = u is equivalent
to λx.t = λx.u, which serves to reduce quantiﬁer complexity for these two theories.
Finally, note that for any setF of sentences,F-consistency is equivalent toF′-completeness, whereF′ = {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈
F}. We therefore look for counterexamples with positive matrix or, better, equational matrix; we also prefer natural
counterexamples. For positive results we can generally do no better than all positive matrices of some preﬁx class.
3. Completeness
We begin with two counterexamples to completeness. The ﬁrst is natural in that it relates to a standard property of
ﬁxed-points; the second is, rather, of a technical nature but it applies to a wider class of models of the λ-calculus.
Lemma 1. For any combinatory logic or λ-calculus term M and variables f , g /∈ FV(M), the terms f (M(gf )) and M(fg) are not
convertible.
Proof. Any reduct of f (M(ff )) has an odd number of f ’s, but any reduct ofM(ff ) has an even number. 
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Theorem 1. The cppo models ofTCL are not 2(EQ )-complete and the cppo models ofTβ orTβη are not 1(EQ )-complete.
Proof. Consider the following sentence:
ϕ1 ≡def ∃y.∀f , g.f (y(Bgf )) = y(Bfg)
where B =def λ*f .λ*g.λ*x.f (gx). This holds in every cppo interpretation of CL by the above remark on least-ﬁxed points.
However, by Lemma 1, it does not hold for open term models. 
The following lemma is immediate from [11]:
Lemma 2. There is a closed term A of the λ-calculus such that the terms:
A(xy)(xy)(xy)(xz) and A(xy)(xz)(xz)(xz)
are λβ-convertible, but the terms:
A(xM)(xM)(xM)(xN) and A(xM)(xM)(xN)(xN)
are not λβη-convertible for any non-λβ-convertible terms M,N not containing x as a free variable.
We then have:
Theorem 2. The ppo models ofTβ orTβη are not 1(EQ )-complete.
Proof. Consider the following sentence:
ϕ2 ≡def ∃y.∀x, z.A(xy)(xy)(xy)(xz) = A(xy)(xy)(xz)(xz)
By the second part of Lemma 2 this is false in the λβη open term model. However, it is true in any ppo model ofTβ or
Tβη as we then have for all elements x,z that:
A(x ⊥)(x ⊥)(x ⊥)(xz)≤A(x ⊥)(x ⊥)(xz)(xz)
≤A(x ⊥)(xz)(xz)(xz)
=A(x ⊥)(x ⊥)(x ⊥)(xz)
with the last equality holding by the ﬁrst part of the lemma. 
We do not know whether the ppo models ofTCL are 2(EQ )-incomplete, or even, for that matter, whether they are
2(POS)-incomplete.
We next present some positive results on completeness, now working our way in the opposite direction: from partially
ordered models to cpo ones. We consider only the case ofTβη in detail, contenting ourselves with remarks on the other
two cases as they are very similar. Our method is proof-theoretic: we deﬁne a λβη ⊥-calculus, an ordered version of the
λβη-calculus with a least element. Its syntax is that of the λ-calculus with an additional constant ⊥. Its axiom system has
inequational judgmentsM ≤ N and the following axioms and rules:
M ≤ M
L ≤ M M ≤ N
L ≤ N
M ≤ M′ N ≤ N′
MN ≤ M′N′
M ≤ N
λx.M ≤ λx.N
⊥≤ M
(λx.M)N = M[N/x]
λx.Mx = M (if x /∈ FV(M))
whereM = N stands for the conjunction of the judgmentsM ≤ N and N ≤ M. Note that the order-exensionality rule:
Mx ≤ Nx
M ≤ N (if x /∈ FV(M) ∪ FV(N))
is derivable.
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A λη ⊥-inequational theory Th is a set of inequationsM ≤ N between λ-terms, possibly containing ⊥ and other constants
from a given set, and closed under the rules and axioms of the λβη ⊥-calculus; any such theory is closed under substitution.
We write M ≤Th N to assert that M ≤ N is in Th and M =Th N to assert that M = N is in it, meaning that both M ≤ N and
N ≤ M are. Such a theory Th is (inequationally) consistent if x ≤ y is not in it; the set of equations it contains forms a λη-
theory, consistent if, and only if, Th is inequationally consistent; and the resulting open termmodelMTh ofTβη (assuming
consistency) is an order-extensional ppo model, setting [M] ≤ [N] if and only ifM ≤Th N.
Let λη ⊥ be the least λη ⊥-inequational theory with ⊥ the only given constant. We seek a characterisation of it in terms
of reduction relations. Let →βη be one step of β- or η-reduction; let →⊥ be the contextual (called compatible in [3]) closure
of the δ-rule ⊥→ M (whereM is any term); and let →βη⊥ be their union.
Lemma 3
(i) Suppose that M →*βη M′ and M →*βη⊥ M′′. Then there is an N such that M′ →*βη⊥ N and M′′ →*βη N.
(ii) M ≤λη⊥ N if and only if there is a term L such that M →*βη⊥ L and N →*βη L.
(iii) LetM andN be termsnot containing⊥ .ThenM ≤λη⊥ N if andonly ifM andN areβη-convertible (and soλη ⊥ is inequationally
consistent).
Proof
(i) First of all ifM →βη M′ andM →⊥ M′′ then there is an N such thatM′ →*⊥ N andM′′ →βη N. This is obvious for the case
of one step of η-reduction. For the case of one step of β-reduction, the case of nonoverlap is trivial; if the δ-rule has been
applied to a redex (λx.L)N, then one can complete the diagramwith one δ-reduction step in case it was applied to L and
with as many as there are occurrences of x in L in case it was applied to N.
The rest of the proof of part 1 is a sequence of diagram chases. It follows ﬁrst that ifM →βη M′ andM →*⊥ M′′ then there
is an N such that M′ →*⊥ N and M′′ →βη N; one then has that if M →*βη M′ and M →*⊥ M′′ then there is an N such that
M′ →*⊥ N andM′′ → *βηN; and this yields the conclusion.
(ii) Clearly, if there is a term L such thatM →*βη⊥ L andN →*βη L thenM ≤λη⊥ N. Conversely,weneed to showthat the relation
between terms M and N of the existence of such an L is closed under the rules and axioms of the λβη ⊥-calculus. The
only non-obvious matter is transitivity and that is immediate from part 1.
(iii) Immediate from part 2. 
Theorem 3. The order-extensional ppo models ofTβη are 1(POS)-complete.
Proof. Any sentence in 1(POS) is provably equivalent to a sentence ϕ of the form ∀x. (t1 = u1 ∨ · · · ∨ tn = un). If true in all
order extensional ppo models ofTβη , ϕ is, in particular, true inMλη⊥, and so, assigning [x] to x, we ﬁnd that Mti =λη⊥ Mui
for some i. So, by the last part of Lemma 3,Mti andMui are βη-convertible. We then have that ti = ui, and so ϕ, is provable in
Tβη . We conclude that ϕ is valid. 
The1(POS)-completeness of (1-order-extensional) ppomodels ofTCL orTβ is established inmuch the sameway. One
introduces CL⊥- and λ ⊥-inequational theories, proves an analogue of Lemma 3 for the minimal such theories CL⊥ and λ ⊥
and takes the open term model of the corresponding theory.
In order to get similar positive results for the smaller class of ω-cppo models we need a few notions concerning ideals in
partial orders.
Deﬁnition 1. An ideal in a partial order P is a downwards-closed subset of P; for any subset X of P we write X ↓ for
{x ∈ P | ∃y ∈ X. x ≤ y}, the least ideal including X; and for any x ∈ P we write x ↓ for {x} ↓. An ideal I is directed if it is
nonempty and any two elements of the ideal have an upper bound in the ideal; it is denumerably generated ifI = X ↓ for
some denumerable subset X ofI.Wewrite Iω(P) (respectively, Id(P)) for the collection of all denumerably generated directed
ideals (respectively, all directed ideals) of P, and partially order them by subset; Iω(P) is an ω-cpo and Id(P) is a dcpo: both
are pointed if, and only if, P is.
Now, given a ppo modelM = (X , K, S, ·) of TCL, we can deﬁne an ω-cppo model Iω(M) of TCL, viz (Iω(X), K ↓, S ↓, ·)
where:
I ·J =def {x · y | x ∈I, y ∈J} ↓
and there is a similar dcppo model Id(M) deﬁned using all directed ideals. Taking a model of the form Iω(MTh), where Th
is a λη ⊥-inequational theory, it is not hard to see that the denotation of a term t is [Mt [M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn]] ↓, if we assign
[M1] ↓, . . . , [Mn] ↓ to its free variables x1, . . . , xn.
There is no general reason why either Iω(M) or Id(M) should be order-extensional, even ifM is. Fortunately, however,
the former is for suitably chosen termmodels. The extension of a λη ⊥-inequational theory Th by a set of constants C is the least
λη ⊥-inequational theory Th(C) which includes Th and whose terms may contain elements of C as constants; it is assumed
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here that C is a set not containing any constant occurring in a term of Th. It is not hard to show that Th(C) is the set of
inequations:
{
M[c1/x1, . . . , cn/xn] ≤ N[c1/x1, . . . , cn/xn] | M ≤Th N, c1, . . . , cn ∈ C
}
(and so, in particular, Th(C) is inequationally consistent of Th is).
Lemma 4. If Th is inequationally consistent then Iω(MTh(C)) is an order-extensional model ofTβη.
Proof. Suppose thatI ·K ⊆J ·K for all directed, countably generated idealsK. Let [M] be an element ofI; we show
it is inJ. AsJ is denumerably generated, it has the form {[Ni]} ↓, and so, as there are uncountably many constants, we can
choose a constant c which does not occur inM or in any of the Ni. TakingK to be [c] ↓ we ﬁnd that [Mc] ∈J · [c] ↓ and so,
for some i, we have Mc ≤Th(C) Nic. Using the above characterisation of Th(C), it follows that Mx ≤Th Nix, where x does not
appear inM or N; we therefore have thatM ≤Th Ni and so that [M] ∈J, as required. 
Theorem 4. The class of order-extensional ω-cppo models ofTβη is 1(POS)-complete.
Proof. If a sentence ∀x. (t1 = u1 ∨ · · · ∨ tn = un) is true in all order-extensional ω-cppo models then, by Lemma 4, it is true
in Iω(Mλη⊥(C)), choosing C to be uncountably inﬁnite. But then, assigning [x] ↓ to x, we ﬁnd that for some i, [Mti ] ↓= [Mui ] ↓
holds, i.e., thatMti =λη⊥(C) Mui . Using the above characterisation of λη ⊥ (C) we then haveMti =λη⊥ Mui and so ϕ is valid. 
Similar ideal-theoretic methods establish the 1(POS)-completeness of the 1-order-extensional ω-cppo models ofTβ
and of ω-cppo models ofTCL. In the latter case one does not have to establish any implication analogous to extensionality
and so it is not necessary to take an uncountable supply of constants. For the same reason it is straightforward to obtain the
1(POS)-completeness of dcppo models ofTCL using the version of the ideal construction with all directed ideals.
It may be that Iω(Mλη⊥) is order-extensional: we leave this as an open problem. We also do not know if Id(Mλη⊥(C)), is
order-extensional for some set of constants C; if it were then 1(POS)-completeness would also hold for order-extensional
dcppo models ofTβη . One could, presumably, then establish 1(POS)-completeness for 1-order-extensional dcppo models
ofTβ similarly.
4. Consistency
We begin by showing the 2(EQ )-inconsistency of proper partially ordered models for all three theories, where a partial
order is proper if it contains distinct elements x and y such that x ≤ y. An applicative structure (X , ·) is a set X equipped with
a binary operation · termed application; every interpretation ofTCL cuts down to such a structure.
Deﬁnition 2
(i) A subsetA of an applicative structure (X , ·) is separable if for each function f :A → X there exists f ∈ X such that f (a) = f · a
for all a ∈ A.
(ii) An applicative structure (X , ·) is ω-separable if each ﬁnite subset of X is separable.
It was shown in [8] that there exists an ω-separable model ofTβη .
Theorem 5. The proper partially ordered models of any ofTCL,Tβ orTβη are not 2(EQ )-consistent.
Proof. Consider the following sentence:
ϕ3 ≡def ∀x, y.∃f .fx = y ∧ fy = x
It is evidently satisﬁed by any ω-separable applicative structure. On the other hand no applicative structure which admits
a proper partial order can satisfy it. For otherwise choose x ≤ y, with x, y distinct. Then there is an f such that fx = y and
fy = x and we have y = fx ≤ fy = x, yielding a contradiction. 
We now consider 2(EQ )-consistency forTβη , which is the same as 1(EQ )-consistency for that theory; we shall return
to the other two theories later. As we shall see, whether or not 1(EQ )-consistency holds depends on the consistency with
Tβη of the following critical sentences:
ϕn,m ≡def ∃ a, c.∀u.Qn,m
where n ≥ 1, m ≥ 2, and a and c, respectively, abbreviate the lists of variables a1, . . . , an and c1, . . . , cm, and Qn,m is the
conjunction of the following equations:
I = a1(λx.u)
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a1(λx.cu) = a2(λx.u)
. . .
an−1(λx.cu) = an(λx.u)
an(λx.cu) = u
where, for i = 1,n, we write ai(λx.cu) and ai(λx.u) to abbreviate the respective terms ai(λx.c1u) . . . (λx.cmu) and ai(λx.u) . . .
(λx.u), the latter withm occurrences of λx.u.
Note that no critical sentence ϕn,m can be satisﬁed by an order-extensional ppomodel. For, if it were, wewould have I ≤⊥,
as we could calculate, using corresponding abbreviations for ⊥:
I = a1(λx. ⊥) ≤ a1(λx.c ⊥)
= a2(λx. ⊥) ≤ · · · ≤ an−1(λx.c ⊥)
= an(λx. ⊥) ≤ an(λx.c ⊥)
= ⊥
and it would then follow, for any x, that x = Ix ≤⊥ x =⊥, contradicting non-triviality.
The problem of determining the consistency of a critical sentence ϕn,m withTβη seems to be very difﬁcult. Substituting
fresh constants for the cj , one obtains an equivalent formulation in terms of the consistency with the λβη-calculus of n + 1
equations, and one could then try a Church–Rosser argument. However, thismethod runs into difﬁcultieswhen, as here, there
are non-linear equations: a well-known example is the failure of conﬂuence for the λβ-calculus with surjective pairing [13,
10.4]. On the other hand, neither is there any obvious proof of inconsistency.
A similar situation ariseswith generalizedMal’cev operatorswhichwere ﬁrst discussed in the context of the λ-calculus by
Selinger [11] and whose consideration helped us ﬁnd the critical sentences; these operators correspond to proper partially
ordered models rather than pointed ones. The corresponding critical sentences assert their existence:
μn ≡def ∃m1, . . . ,mn.∀x, y.R′n
where R′n is the conjunction of the following set of equations:
x = m1xyy
m1xxy = m2xyy
. . .
mn−1xxy = mnxyy
mnxxy = y
These equations are also nonlinear and it is not known if any of the μn are consistent withTCL (it is known that the ﬁrst
two are inconsistent [11]). There is a connection with our critical sentences that is worth noticing, thatTCL  μn ⇒ ψn,2.
The discussion now forks into two cases. In the ﬁrst, let us assume that some critical sentence ϕn,m is consistentwithTβη .
In this case, by the above remarks, the order-extensional ppo models are 1(EQ )-inconsistent forTβη . One further then
conjectures, under the same assumption, that substituting 1i for ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and 2j for cj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) in the matrix of
the critical formula, the resulting formula ϕ′n,m remains consistent (where  is (SII)(SII) and k is the kth Church numeral, viz
λf .λx.f kx). One sees, as before, that ϕ′n,m is not true in any order-extensional ppo model ofTβ , and so, under this additional
assumption one has that the order-extensional ppo models are EQ-inconsistent forTβη . Let us remark, ﬁnally, that the
discussion here a fortiori also applies to the narrower class of order-extensional cppo models.
We now turn to the second case where all the critical sentences ϕn,m are inconsistent with Tβη aiming to establish
1(EQ )-consistency. For any λη-theory Th whose terms do not contain the constant ⊥, let Th*be the least λη ⊥-inequational
theory containing all the equations of Th, and let Th⊥ be the least λη-theory including Th whose terms may contain ⊥; it is
easily veriﬁed that it consists of all equations M[⊥ /x] = N[⊥ /x] whereM =Th N and x is any variable.
We next characterise Th* in terms of Th⊥ and a relation , where MN holds if and only if for some m ≥ 0, there are
terms A, C1, . . . ,Cm such that:
M =Th⊥ A(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)
withm (λx. ⊥)’s and:
A(λx.C1 ⊥) . . . (λx.Cm ⊥) =Th⊥ N
As will be clear, without loss of generality we can insist that the terms A, C1, . . . ,Cm do not contain ⊥. Also, by adding
dummy arguments to A, we can increasem.
Lemma 5
(i) The relation includes ≤Th⊥; it is closed under application and λ-abstraction; and ⊥M holds for all terms M.
(ii) The relations* and ≤
Th*
coincide.
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Proof
(i) First includes Th⊥ as ifM =Th⊥ N then, takingm = 0 and A =def M, we see thatMN. Next ⊥M holds for any term
M, as we see if we takem = 1, A =def λx.x ⊥ and C1 =def λy.M, with y /∈ FV(M).
To show closure under application, suppose thatMN andM′N′ so that:
M =Th⊥ A(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)
N =Th⊥ A(λx.C1 ⊥) . . . (λx.Cm ⊥)
M′ =Th⊥ A′(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)
N′ =Th⊥ A′(λx.C ′1 ⊥) . . . (λx.C ′m′ ⊥)
hold, for some terms A, C1, . . . ,Cm and A
′, C ′
1
, . . . ,C ′m′ . We then have:
MM′ =Th⊥ A′′(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)
NN′ =Th⊥ A′′(λx.C1 ⊥) . . . (λx.Cm ⊥)(λx.C ′1 ⊥) . . . (λx.C ′m′ ⊥)
where A′′ is λu1, . . . ,um.λu′1, . . . ,u
′
m′Au1 . . .um(A
′u′
1
. . .u′m′ ), and so, as desired, we haveMM
′NN′.
To show closure under λ-abstraction, suppose thatMN so that:
M =Th⊥ A(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)
N =Th⊥ A(λx.C1 ⊥) . . . (λx.Cm ⊥)
hold, for some terms A, C1, . . . ,Cm. We then have that:
λy.M =Th⊥ A′(λy.λx. ⊥) . . . (λy.λx. ⊥)
λy.N =Th⊥ A′(λy.λx.C1 ⊥) . . . (λy.λx.Cm ⊥)
where A′ is λu1, . . . ,um.λy.A(u1y) . . . (umy). But then we have that:
λy.M =Th⊥ A′′(λz. ⊥) . . . (λz. ⊥)
λy.N =Th⊥ A′′(λz.C1[(z)0/y, (z)1/x] ⊥) . . . (λz.Cm[(z)0/y, (z)1/x] ⊥)
where A′′ is λu1, . . . ,um.A′((λy.λx.u1[y, x]) . . . (λyλx.um[y, x])), andwe are using the pairing notation of [3, 6.2]. This shows
that, as desired, λy.Mλy.N.
(ii) It follows at once from part 1 that * is a λη ⊥-theory including Th. To show it is the least such, let Th′ be any other.
Then ifMN we have:
M =Th⊥ A(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥) ≤Th′ A(λx.C1 ⊥) . . . (λx.Cm ⊥) =Th⊥ N
for some terms A, C1, . . . ,Cm and soM ≤Th′ N. This shows that Th′ includes and so, as required,*. 
It follows from this lemma that Th* is inequationally consistent if and only if it is not the case that I* ⊥; for the the next
lemma assume that Th is consistent.
Lemma 6. If I* ⊥ then some critical sentence is satisﬁed by the open term model of Th.
Proof. By assumption, and adding an extra reﬂexive link if needed, we have a chain:
IM1 · · ·Mn ⊥
for some n ≥ 1. We therefore have an m ≥ 2 and terms Ai (i = 1,n) and terms Ci,j (i = 1,n, j = 1,m) not containing ⊥ such
that:
I =Th⊥ A1(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)
A1(λx.C0,1 ⊥) . . . (λx.C0,m ⊥) =Th⊥ M1 =Th⊥ A2(λx. ⊥) . . . (λx. ⊥)
. . .
An(λx.Cn,1 ⊥) . . . (λx.Cn,m ⊥) =Th⊥⊥
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It follows that:
I =Th A1(λx.u) . . . (λx.u)
A1(λx.C0,1u) . . . (λx.C0,mu) =Th A2(λx.u) . . . (λx.u)
. . .
An(λx.Cn,1u) . . . (λx.Cn,mu) =Th u
We need a version of these equations in which the Ci,j do not depend on i. To that end deﬁne A
′
i
(for i = 1,n) by:
A′1 =def λx1,1, . . . , x1,m, . . . , xn,1, . . . , xn,m.A1x1,1, . . . , x1,m
. . .
A′n =def λx1,1, . . . , x1,m, . . . , xn,1, . . . , xn,m.Anxn,1, . . . , xn,m
takem′ =def nm and deﬁne C ′k (for k = 1,m′) by setting:
C ′1, . . . ,C
′
m′ =def C1,1, . . . ,C1,m, . . . ,Cn,1, . . . ,Cn,m
We can then rewrite our equations in the form:
I =Thu A′1(λx.u) . . . (λx.u)
A′1(λx.C
′
1u) . . . (λx.C
′
m′u) =Th A′2(λx.u) . . . (λx.u)
. . .
A′n(λx.C ′1u) . . . (λx.C
′
m′u) =Th u
and so the open term model of Th satisﬁes the critical sentence ϕn,m′ , which concludes the proof. 
Theorem 6. Suppose that all the critical sentences ϕn,m are inconsistent withTβη. Then the order-extensional ω-cppo models of
Tβη are 1(EQ )-consistent.
Proof. Let ϕ be a 1(EQ )-sentence. Without loss of generality, we can take it to be of the form ∃x. t = u. If there is a model
ofTβη that satisﬁes it, then there is one ofTβη extended by a constant c that satisﬁes t[c/x] = u[c/x], and there is therefore
a consistent λη-theory Th containing the equationMt[c/x] = Mu[c/x].
So by the assumption that all the critical sentences ϕn,m are inconsistent with Tβη , we get, using Lemmas 5 and 6,
that Th* is inequationally consistent. SoM
Th*
is an order-extensional ppo model ofTβη satisfying t[c/x] = u[c/x] and so
ϕ. Taking an extension Th*(C) of Th* by uncountably many constants, one further has, by Lemma 4, that Iω(MTh*(C)) is an
order-extensional ω-cppo model ofTβη satisfying ϕ. 
If, as discussed above, one could establish order-extensionality for directed ideal models one would further have1(EQ )-
consistency for order-extensional dcppo models under the asme assumption.
Let us now turn to the other two theories. First, in the case ofTβ , 2(EQ )-consistency is again the same as 1(EQ )-
consistency, the same critical sentences ϕn,m serve, and the problem of determining their consistency withTβ again seems
to be difﬁcult. No critical sentence can be satisﬁed by an 1-order-extensional ppo model and so, if some critical sentence is
consistent we have 1(EQ )-inconsistency and, under the same assumption, one further conjectures EQ-inconsistency. On
the other hand, if every critical sentence is inconsistent withTβ one deduces 1(EQ )-consistency for 1-order-extensional
ω-cppo models. The proof is entirely analogous to that of Theorem 6, starting from the λβ ⊥-calculus, which is just the
λβη ⊥-calculusminus η-conversion. Finally, as before, if one could establish 1-order-extensionality for directed ideal models
one would also have such consistency for 1-order-extensional dcppo models.
Next, in the case ofTCL, one does not have λ-abstraction and the simpler critical sentences:
ψn,m ≡def ∃ a, c.∀u.Rn,m
serve, where n ≥ 1,m ≥ 2, and a and c, respectively, abbreviate the lists of variables a1, . . . , an and c1, . . . , cm, and Rn,m is the
conjunction of the following equations:
I = a1u
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a1(cu) = a2u
. . .
an−1(cu) = anu
an(cu) = u
where for i = 1,n, ai(cu) and aiu abbreviate ai(c1u) . . . (cmu) and aiu . . .u, respectively, both with m u’s. The problem of
determining their consistency with TCL may be easier than in the case of the λ-calculus, but, of course, non-linearity
remains.
No critical sentence ψn,m can be satisﬁed by a ppo model and so, if one were consistent, we would have 2(EQ )-
inconsistency and, under the same assumption, one further conjectures1(EQ )-inconsistency. On the other hand, assuming
every such sentence inconsistent, one deduces 2(EQ )-consistency for cppo models (both forms of ideal model work). The
proof is, as before, entirely analogous to that of Theorem 6, but is simpler as there are no abstractions to consider: the only
point is to use the Curry abstraction operator instead, wherever necessary.
Finally, let us consider sentences with positive matrix. We have already established 2(EQ )-inconsistency and 2(EQ )-
inconsistency for all three theories, assuming, in the latter case, that some critical sentence is inconsistent. Assuming instead
that every critical sentence is consistent it may nonetheless be that2(POS)- or even1(POS)-inconsistency holds; we leave
these as open problems. Note that 1(POS)-consistency is equivalent to 1(EQ )-consistency as every 1(POS) sentence is
equivalent to a ﬁnite disjunction of 1(EQ ) sentences.
4.1. A possible natural counterexample
We give natural 2(EQ )-sentences (ϕ
′
4
and ϕ′′
4
, below) which may provide counterexamples to the 2(EQ )-consistency,
or even the 1(EQ )-consistency of cppo models. Consider the following sentence:
ϕ4 ≡def ∃x, y. ∀z. x(yz) = y(xz) ∧ ∀z.xz /= yz
As commuting continuous functions on a cppo have a common ﬁxed-point, this sentence is satisﬁed by no cppo models
ofTCL . However, as we now show, it is consistent withTβη . The following result is interesting especially because it answers
(negatively) an open question raised more than 25 years ago by Dana Scott,2 as to whether in a formal λ-theory commuting
functions always have a common ﬁxed point. Let Com be the λη-theory with two constants f and g and the equation:
f (g(x)) = g(f (x))
Proposition 1. The theory Com is consistent. There is, however, no term M such that f (M) =Com g(M).
Proof. Let δ-reduction, →δ , be the contextual closure of the relation generated by following two rules:
f (gM) → g(fM) g(fM) → f (gM)
We begin by showing that ifM =Com N then we have thatM →*βη M′ →*δ N′ and N →*βη N′ for someM′ and N′ (the converse
is evident). It is enough to show that the relation between M and N of the existence of such an M′ and N′ is transitive. To
that end, one ﬁrst shows that an application of a δ-rule “commutes" with one step of β- or η-reduction in the sense that if
M →δ N →βη P, then there exists Q such thatM →βη Q →nδ P. This is clear for η-reduction. For β-reduction, if the δ-rule has
been applied to a subterm of the form f (gP), then if the β-reduction involves only P the result is trivial, otherwise the whole
of the subterm g(fP) is involved. But then the application of the δ-rule can be postponed, possibly using it more than once.
It then immediately follows that if M →*δ N →*βη P, then there exists Q such that M →*βη Q →*δ P. Transitivity follows from
this result and the Church–Rosser theorem for the λβη-calculus with extra constants.
We next need to look at δ-reduction in more detail. For any π ∈ {f , g}*, deﬁne π · M recursively for termsM by:  · M = M,
(fπ) · M = f (π · M) and (gπ) · M = g(π · M). Every term M can be analysed uniquely in the form πM · M0 where M0 is not of
either of the forms f (M1) or g(M1); we call πM the preﬁx ofM. IfM and N are δ-convertible then πM and πN are permutations
of each other and ifM →*βη N then πM is a preﬁx of πN .
Now to establish the rest of proposition suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists M such that f (M) =Com
g(M). Fromtheabove it follows that there existM′ andM′′, such thatM →*βη M′, f (M′) →*δ g(M′′) andM →*βη M′′. It follows that
fπM′ and gπM′′ are permutations of each other, and so, in particular, πM′ and πM′′ have the same length. But by Church–Rosser
M′ and M′′ have a common βη-reduct, and so πM′ = πM′′ . But this contradicts the fact that fπM′ and gπM′′ are permutations
of each other, concluding the proof. 
Now consider the following sentence:
2 Personal communication, March, 1981.
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ϕ′4 ≡def ∃x, y, d. ∀z.x(yz) = y(xz) ∧ ∀z.dz(xz) = T ∧ dz(yz) = F
where T is λ*x.λ*y.x and F is λ*x.λ*y.y. It implies ϕ4, relative to CL. So if we can prove it is consistent with one of our three
theories, then we have a counterexample to 2(EQ )-consistency of cppo models of that theory. As before the difﬁculty with
ﬁnding a Church–Rosser argument is the non-linearity of the equations. Note too that if we replace the non-linear equations
with the linear d(xz) = T ∧ d(yz) = F then the resulting sentence is inconsistent withTCL, so the non-linearity certainly
plays a rôle. Finally if, following a previous thought, we could prove consistency then, replacing x, y and d by 1, 2 and 3,
the resulting sentence ϕ′′
4
might even provide a counterexample to 1(EQ )-consistency. Whether these sentences do indeed
provide counterexamples we leave as open problems.
4.2. On quantiﬁer-free inconsistency
We consider consistency for sentences with arbitrary matrices, but, at least for the λ-calculus, quantiﬁer-free. Let Th be
the λη-theory generated by the equation:
xx = 
Lemma 7. The theory Th is consistent and, for any terms M and N,we have that MN =Th  holds if, and only if,M =Th N does.
Proof. Consistency follows from, e.g., a Church–Rosser argument that the stronger theory generated by the equationMN =
 is consistentwith theλβη-calculus. The rest is Lemma3.1of [9], butadapted to theλβη-calculus; theproof is exactlySalibra’s,
but with the evident additions to account for η-conversion. 
Theorem 7. The sentence:
∀x.xx =  ∧  /= (KI)
is consistent withTβη but no ppo model ofTCL satisﬁes it.
Proof. For the ﬁrst part note that the equation  = (KI) is not in Th. For, if it were, by Lemma 7 we would have,
successively that  = KI and K = I were too, contradicting the consistency of Th. For the second part, one follows the
argument in the proof of Theorem 3.5 of [9] to show that in any ppo model of CL the sentence  = (KI) holds. 
We therefore have that consistency fails for quantiﬁer-free sentences and ppomodels for our two λ-calculus theoriesTβ
andTβη , and also that 1-consistency fails forTCL. The formula:
∀x.1xx = 1 ∧ 2(1) = T ∧ 2(11(1KI)) = F
might then provide a counterexample to EQ or 1(EQ )-consistency. The difﬁculty, as always, is non-linearity, here of the
ﬁrst equation, and it is an open question as to whether the sentence is indeed a counterexample.
In [5], Honsell and Ronchi Della Rocca give a consistent λ-theory which is not the theory of any retract model. One can
extract another example, if of narrower scope, from this work, namely that the following quantiﬁer-free sentence ϕ5 is
consistent withTβ but has no retract models:
 =  ∧ λx.(x) = λx.x ∧
λxy.(x(y))(x(y)) = λxy.(x(y(y)) ∧  /= λx.
Note that we still have non-linearity. A similar quantiﬁer-free non-linear sentence ϕ′5 can be found using the work of
Manzonetto and Salibra [7]; the sentence in question is to the effect that  is a central element in their sense that differs
from both T and F.
5. Concluding remarks
Considering just the λβη-calculus, an interesting example of a 2-sentence true in all retract models but not in every
model is the following:
ϕ6 ≡def ∃a, b, c, d, e. a /= b ∧ (cd = a) ∧ (ce = b) ∧ (∀x. cx = a ∨ cx = b)
In fact, in any retract model (X , K, S, ·) the function:
x ∈ X → if x ≤ a then ⊥ else a
where a is any element of the model different from the bottom element is continuous, hence representable. So each retract
model satisﬁes ϕ6. On the other hand, as shown in [3], the open term model of λβη satisﬁes the range property, whereby
the range of any term is either inﬁnite or else the term denotes a constant, so falsifying ϕ6. The question whether there is an
order-extensional ppo, or even cppo, model which satisﬁes the range property remains open.
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One can relativize the basic notions of this paper. Given two classes ofmodelsC ⊆ C′ of a theoryT and a set of sentences
F, one can enquire ifC isF-complete orF-consistent relative toC′. As an example, the directed ideal constructions show
that cppo models ofTCL are consistent relative to ppo models for 2(POS). This may fail for 2; the sentence ϕ4 would
provide a counterexample if one could show, for example, that Proposition 1 held for Com*, the least λ ⊥-inequational
theory including Com.
Another such question is whether one can separate the cppo models from the retract ones. For example, assuming that
all the critical sentences ϕn,m are inconsistent with Tβ , are the retract models quantiﬁer-free-consistent relative to the
order-extensional ω-cppo models ofTβ? One of the sentences ϕ5 or ϕ′5 may provide a counterexample.
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